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The Legendary Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese
Army in the Defence of Singapore during the
Japanese Invasion of February 1942
JOHN KWOK
University of Wollongong
Known as the Overseas Anti-Japanese Army by the Chinese in Singapore but officially as
Dalforce by the British, this was a Chinese militia unit formed to defend Singapore Island
during the Japanese invasion in 1942. Its unit history written by its deputy commander Major
Hu Tie Jun suggests that the Overseas Anti-Japanese Army was a heroic and patriotic army.
The legendary exploits of the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army has since been picked up
by Singaporean journalist writer Foong Choon Hon and made into a popular wartime narrative
in Singapore in his best seller war narrative The Price of Peace. Since its publication in 1995,
Singaporeans have regarded Foong’s work as an authority on Singapore’s war history.
However, popular war narratives like the ones found in The Price of Peace are not necessarily
history; Foong’s re-interpretation of Dalforce contains many errors, inconsistencies and
embellishments. At best Foong’s The Price of Peace can only qualify as popular war literature.
The many problems found in Foong’s work on Singapore Overseas Anti-Japanese Army,
however, points to larger issues on writing war history in Singapore. What The Price of Peace
represents is a way of writing and presenting history that is both accommodating and
comfortable to Singaporeans. It is a fine example of a nation’s search for identity separate from
its colonial past.

The Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army was formed during the Japanese
invasion of Malaya. Many Chinese who had settled in Malaya and Singapore joined the
ranks of this army with the desire to fight the Japanese and to defend their property and
family. Many from all walks of life came forward to be part of the Volunteer Army
(VA). Dressed in their Chinese Nationalist-inspired blue uniforms and armed with any
available weapons they could find, they marched bravely to the front to confront the
enemy. These volunteers held Singapore’s western sector and when the Japanese
crossed the Straits of Johore into Singapore, they put up a brave and stubborn defence.
On the night of 6 February 1942, the VA, supported by the Australians, sank and killed
a large Japanese patrol that was crossing the Straits. It was a spectacular but short-lived
victory. The Japanese pressed on with their attack and when the Japanese finally
established a beachhead in Singapore, volunteers of the VA fought courageously for
hours, determined to hold back the Japanese horde. When the Allied lines of defence
began to falter, the VA continued to hold the front until they too were forced to retreat,
but only when their food and ammunition had run out. In nearly every battle, the VA
was determined to hold the ground against the Japanese but was let down time and
again by the Allied forces who kept on retreating. Each time the Japanese advanced,
the Allied forces retreated and the volunteers had to reluctantly follow suit. In the end,
it was all too little too late; on 13 February the decision was made to disband the VA.
After the Allies surrendered on 15 February 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)
immediately launched a mopping up operation, singling out members of the VA
because they had fought courageously against the Japanese. Many volunteers either
© 2009 The Author.
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fled Singapore or were forced into hiding as the Japanese regarded them as dangerous
elements. In the process of persecuting volunteers of the VA, the IJA carried out a
bloody massacre of the population in Singapore known later as the Sook Ching
Massacre.
That is the history of the VA according to Singaporean sources, particularly in a
popular publication on the war titled, The Price of Peace. Subtitled True Accounts of
the Japanese Occupation, it is a collection of narratives that attempts to document antiJapanese activities carried out by the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya during the
Second World War. Amongst all the anti-Japanese organisations of the time, the VA is
prominently, even passionately, featured. The principal editor of the book, Foong
Choon Hon, is a journalist and trained broadcaster, and well positioned in the media
industry. 1 Since its publication, The Price of Peace has proved to be immensely
popular. It inspired the creation of a top-rating Chinese drama series shown on
Singapore television in 1997 titled He Ping de Dai Jia (Price of Peace). At Singapore’s
prestigious media industry awards, the Star Awards, He Ping de Dai Jia won the award
for best drama series. Ten years later it was re-screened on television in Singapore and
again it was popularly received.
The success of The Price of Peace demonstrates the community’s thirst for popular
local historical war narratives, perhaps like the popular narratives about Gallipoli or
Kokoda within an Australian context. Yet, its widespread popularity deserves closer
analysis because popular wartime narratives are not necessarily history. This is
especially important because institutions in Singapore have gone one step further by
making The Price of Peace an authority on the war in Singapore. The book is listed in
the National University of Singapore Library’s collection, ‘A Sense of History: A
Select Bibliography in the History of Singapore’, a list that also included works by
notable historians. In 2002, the Singapore Nanyang University of Technology placed it
in a public book display with works that were regarded as important to Singapore’s
National Education policy. The Singapore Ministry of Defence also cites material from
the book in its official versions of Singapore’s military history. Indeed, the book’s
influence is clearly seen in the remarks made by Singapore’s Minister for Information
and the Arts, George Yeo, at the book launch of the English edition in 1997 when he
affirmed that the book was ‘very important for national education’, because it was a
‘major contribution to the study of our history’.2
The Price of Peace has come to encapsulate the Singaporean memory and
experience of the Battle of Singapore because it departs from the dominant Western
narratives of the war in Singapore. Such narratives are often preoccupied with the
Battle and Fall of Singapore, generally ignoring the period of the Japanese Occupation
unless they are examining the experience of specific groups like Australian prisoners of
war or unit battle honours. In narratives such as those, the voices of the locals are
sidelined, if not ignored. Foong’s The Price of Peace is an attempt to rewrite the Battle,
Fall and Occupation of Singapore without relying extensively on Western sources. It is
an attempt to reclaim a series of past events and reinterpret it as indigenous or local
history, a Singaporean history. Put in another way, it presents a challenge to Western
colonial history.
The reorientation of Singapore’s war past is necessary but Foong’s work has fallen
short as a serious challenge to the dominant Western perspective and narratives of the
war. The history of VA in The Price of Peace is based on the unit war history written
by its deputy commander, Hu Tie Jun. Hu wrote three essays based on the unit history
which were then compiled into a book called War History of the Singapore Overseas
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Chinese Volunteer Army. Written after the war, Foong claimed Hu’s work offered ‘an
insight into the defence war the volunteer army fought in the front line against the
Japanese’.3 Yet, Hu’s account and Foong’s reinterpretation suggest that both authors
were more interested in what they wished the Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army could
have achieved rather than what it actually did. When cross-referencing popular
accounts of the VA with non-Singaporean sources, a different picture emerges.
Frequently garnished with embellishments, the narratives in The Price of Peace are
difficult to corroborate with non-Singaporean sources of the time. And while the
narratives presented in The Price of Peace appeal to the local communities in
Singapore, they will not be taken seriously elsewhere, not because Western research
and historiography are superior in some sense, but because Foong’s work with The
Price of Peace is more akin to fiction than it is history.
The official name of the VA was Dalforce, named after its commander, LieutenantColonel John Dally, the former Superintendent of the Malayan Police Special Branch.4
Its deputy commander was a Chinese national, Major Hu Tie Jun. With the exception
of Hu, command down to company level was exclusively British. The Chinese
provided the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file. In an attempt to ignore
its colonial origins and British links, The Price of Peace does not refer to this Chinese
militia as Dalforce. It prefers to call it the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer
Army, or just the VA. The choice of name of the volunteer force is significant because
it has bearing on the representation and interpretation of the unit’s history.
The Price of Peace suggests that the VA was an independent army and claims that
on 1 February 1942, ‘the British authorities … brought the Volunteer Army (VA)
under its command’. 5 Dalforce, however, had always been under British command. It
was raised by British as a militia force with British trainers, weapons and leaders, and
was originally allocated to the III Indian Corps of the British Indian Army.6 However,
in the days leading up to the main Japanese invasion of Singapore, the plan was revised
and instead Dalforce Companies were distributed to various Allied units ‘to be the eyes
and ears of the main forces on the perimeter of the island facing Johore … they were
just a fringe, part of a defence arrangement’.7 Dalforce was at best a screening force in
a reconnaissance role for the main British and Commonwealth forces in Singapore.
The use of the noun ‘army’ in the ‘Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer
Army’ is also rather misleading. The Price of Peace suggests that the VA was
organised into battalions, with eight battalions which would have made it nearly 4,800men strong. If accurate, this would have made the VA a brigade-size force, two rungs
away from what would qualify as an army. But it was, in fact, far smaller than that.
According to one British trainer of Dalforce, Frank Brewer, Dalforce was made up of
five companies which would have given it an active strength of 750.8 The numbers who
actually fought could have been lower. Brewer suggested that ‘some of them probably
never went up at all’.9
If Dalforce was not an army, where did it sit in the British Army’s order of battle?
The ranks of its senior command staff, John Dalley, a Lieutenant-Colonel and Hu Tie
Jun, a Major, would suggest that the Chinese volunteer force was, at best, the
equivalent of a battalion, the basic combat unit in the British Army during the war. 10
The Price of Peace mentions their ranks but it also made an unusual claim with regards
to Dalforce’s Chinese deputy commander: the rank of Major was ‘not recognised by
the British Army’.11 Either the book’s editor is suggesting that Hu’s appointment by the
British as deputy commander was not officially recognised or that it was rejected by
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Foong in his attempt to maintain the notion that the Chinese volunteer force was an
‘army’. The latter seems to have been his intention.
Finally, by presenting the VA as an army, The Price of Peace suggests that the VA
was the mainstay of Singapore’s defences rather than Malaya Command. In fact, it
reverses the roles of the VA and Malaya Command. Hence, during the Battle of
Singapore, the VA in The Price of Peace is presented as an army that was ‘flanked by
soldiers from Allied Forces, [whilst] our comrades took on the enemy’.12 For example,
at Jurong Road, the book records that the VA was ‘flanked by the Australian Brigade
on the right’.13 And at Lim Chu Kang, the VA ‘combined forces with the 300-strong
Australian brigade … this greatly boosted our strength’.14 Here Foong is clearly
manipulating the figures in suggesting that a 300-strong Australian Brigade augmented
the larger Chinese Volunteer ‘army’. Australian sources, however, indicate that the
22nd Australian Infantry Brigade at Lim Chu Kang, comprising the 2/18, 2/19 and 2/20
Australian Infantry Battalions had a total reported strength of 107 officers and 2,365
other ranks. Furthermore, the unit war diary of the 2/20 Australian Infantry Battalion
also clearly indicates that the Dalforce company at Lim Chu Kang came under its
battalion strength along with detachments from the 2/15 Australian Field Regiment,
15th Australian Anti-Tank Regiment and the 2/4 Australian Machine Gun Battalion.15
With Dalforce Companies scattered throughout the larger Allied army defending
Singapore, it would be more accurate to claim that a company sized Dalforce unit was
supporting a much larger brigade-sized force on its flanks.16
Battle accounts of the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in The
Price of Peace are equally problematic. They range from the improbable to the
impossible. The description of a battle involving one Dalforce company at Lim Chu
Kang Road on 8 February during the Japanese main assault on Singapore is an example
of the improbable. Foong wrote:
[A] fierce battle soon took its toll on us as people and the Allied soldiers began to retreat. Those
[volunteers] in the frontline continued to resist the enemy. As the battle dragged on, the VA ran
out of food and ammunition.17

The Australian unit war diaries, written close to the events recorded the sequence of
events very differently. On the night of 8 February 1942, the war diary of the 22nd
Australian Infantry Brigade recorded:
Enemy landings and attempted landings: on 2/20 Bn front … estimated strength one coy came in
contact with Dalforce and then moved at jog trot towards area 6824 … overran one tp of 4.5
Howitzers in area 6825.18

If the Australian source is to be trusted, there was no determined resistance, no retreat
on their part, nor even a battle as described in The Price of Peace.
The training of Dalforce volunteers and weapons they received also suggest that the
achievements of the VA promoted in The Price of Peace are also questionable, not
because the volunteers may have lacked courage or commitment, but because they
were under-trained and under-equipped. The decision to raise a local Chinese militia
force was made in December 1941 but by the time the volunteers were assembled for
training, there was little opportunity: it was a matter of days rather than weeks.19
Dalforce trainer Frank Brewer described the type of training and instruction the
volunteers received as ‘a little bit of parade ground drill and shouting, so they got used
to taking orders’, and ‘how not to shoot or blow oneself up with their weapons’.20 This
was far from basic military training. For weapons, Brewer recalled that they were
issued with ‘shotguns, seven round of ammunition and two grenades each’.21 The 2/20
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Australian Infantry Battalion’s official war history corroborates Brewer: the Dalforce
volunteers under its command were ‘armed with parangs, shot-guns and a variety of
firearms’.22 The Price of Peace also acknowledges the ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘outdated’
variety of shotguns and hunting rifles handed to the volunteers. Given the state of
training and weapons of Dalforce, it is unlikely that a company of lightly armed,
hastily trained and untested Chinese volunteers could have engaged the well-trained
and equipped Imperial Japanese Army in pitched battles that raged for hours until the
volunteers were forced to retreat only when they had exhausted their food and
ammunition.23 Even better-trained and equipped troops could not withstand the
Japanese assault: when two Japanese divisions attacked the defensive positions held by
22nd Australian Infantry Brigade on the night of 8 February, the brigade was badly
mauled.
Other battle accounts of the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army found
in The Price of Peace verge on the impossible. The Price of Peace claims that on 6
February 1942 the VA, stationed at Jurong Road, was hit by machinegun fire and ‘a
fierce battle erupted as Japanese troops charged towards us … both sides suffered
casualties’.24 Apparently the Japanese were repulsed because the next day, Jurong Road
came under enemy artillery attack before the Japanese re-commenced their attack and
‘in the intense fighting that followed, both sides suffered heavy casualties’.25 On 9
February, after the initial Japanese assault, the VA and the Australians had regrouped
and launched a combined counter-offensive that broke the Japanese morale and chased
the enemy back ‘for a good five miles’.26 The problem with this account is that no
Japanese troops could have been on Singapore Island on 6 February for they were still
in the stages of preparation: they landed on 8 February.27 And when the Japanese main
assault commenced on the night of 8 February it took place at Lim Chu Kang Road,
well away from Jurong Road. As for the combined VA-Australian counter-offensive
that took place on 9 February, Australian unit war diaries record that the Diggers were
re-establishing a new line of defence after withdrawing from the initial main Japanese
assault.28 None spoke of a counter-offensive that chased the Japanese five miles back to
the coastline.
It is clear then, that the history of Dalforce presented in The Price of Peace is
seriously flawed. But it begs the question, why did Foong offer a history that is so
easily challenged? Why are the local war narratives presented in The Price of Peace
problematic? The answer lies in two powerful Chinese war literature genres,
Kuomintang (KMT) literary works and ‘Resistance Literature’. Historians Kevin
Blackburn and Daniel Chew in Singapore have specifically identified Singaporean
Dalforce narratives as following a style of writing that was typical of China’s
Kuomintang literary works.29 It was a style that fashioned heroic legends by
exaggerating and embellishing local narratives of the war.30 In Blackburn and Chew’s
reappraisal of Dalforce’s history, they described the Dalforce narratives during the war
in Singapore as ‘A heroic legend … written into the history books by an Overseas
Chinese Community in Singapore that desired to see itself as united in the struggle
against Japan’. 31
The Price of Peace was a product of its times from the Chinese community whose
historiography reflects the powerful tradition of Chinese nationalist-styled writing.
There are others, and these narratives became a product and reflection of the Chinese
community’s way of interpreting Singapore’s history that saw the war against Japan
‘through nationalist glasses … in the struggle with their comrades in China against an
aggressive and belligerent Japan’.32
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Events unfolding in the conflict between China and Japan were closely monitored
by the Chinese diaspora in Singapore. When Japan invaded China in 1937, the Chinese
community in Singapore rallied and established relief organisations to aid China.33 The
largest of such organisations was the China Relief Fund, established by an influential
Chinese businessman, Tan Kah Kee. It not only raised a considerable sum of money,
but also recruited volunteers to serve as truck drivers along the Burma Road, a vital
supply route for the KMT Chinese in the war against Japan.34 After war had broken out
in Europe in 1939, the British in Malaya attempted to ride on the wave of established
Chinese patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments in the local Chinese community. To
rally Chinese support for their war in Europe, they put up posters that read ‘Help
Britain and you help China’.35
The close affinity between the Chinese in Singapore and China is also illustrated in
the Chinese volunteers’ choice of colour for their uniforms. To differentiate themselves
from the regular forces in Singapore they chose blue.36 Blue as a colour had its roots in
the formation of the National Revolutionary Army of China, an uneasy alliance formed
between the Communist Party of China and the KMT Nationalist Army to fight the
Japanese under one banner. The winter uniforms of the KMT were blue and, with no
official uniforms of their own, it was not uncommon for Communist soldiers to don
KMT uniforms. 37 The majority of Singapore’s Chinese migrant population hails from
the southern provinces of China, a region that was not only a KMT stronghold but also
where its seat of power was located. Dalforce was raised in the winter of 1941 and its
volunteers adopted the same colours as their brethren in Southern China to present a
united regional front against the invading Japanese.
Migrant Chinese writers and journalists in Singapore before the war were a product
of their times. They had been inspired by the rich harvest of Chinese literary works
from China which were characteristically nationalistic and stridently anti-Japanese.38
For instance, an article published in Chungking in 1939 titled ‘They Fight with Paper
Bullets’ referred in glowing terms to the ‘army of Chinese journalists’ who ‘are
fighting Japan with their pens and brushes no less earnestly than their comrades at the
front’.39 Similarly, in Malaya and Singapore prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War,
Chinese intellectuals were producing popular literature to express their patriotic
sentiments and to rally popular support for China’s war against Japan. The Chinese
diaspora in Singapore, then, was just as keen to promote anti-Japanese sentiments,
nationalist sentiment and patriotism in defending the homeland. Dubbed collectively as
‘Resistance Literature’, the tradition of these literary works would prove to have a
longstanding legacy in Singapore. 40
After the war, independence movements across the Southeast Asian region saw the
rise of a new type of literature in Singapore and Malaya that reflected the new concerns
of a postwar world. In the mid-1950s, new literary genres called ‘popular patriotic
literature’ and ‘patriotic literature’ emerged in Singapore and Malaya; patriotism was
defined as anti-colonialism.41 Not only was it anti-colonial, it was also characterised by
the desire to create a distinct local literary culture in Singapore and Malaysia.42 The
genre was popular especially within the local born Straits Chinese intellectual circles in
Singapore and Malaya who saw themselves as part of a uniquely Singapore and
Malayan Chinese literature in the making.43 Yet, the publication of The Price of Peace
in 1997 demonstrates that the ‘Resistance Literature’ genre still has a strong hold. Its
interpretation of the history of Dalforce harks back to the earlier style of writing and
expression that is distinctively nationalistic and well within the genre of ‘Resistance
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Literature’. This is because Chinese nationalism in Singapore, despite attempts to
create a unique local literary culture, has persisted since 1945.
In 1946, the British Military Administration (BMA) in Singapore proposed that a
war memorial be constructed and dedicated to the civilian war dead of Singapore.44 But
this ran contrary to sentiment in Singapore’s Chinese community which actively sought
to enshrine the patriotism and sacrifices of their war dead. Tan Kah Kee, who formerly
led the China Relief Fund efforts, proposed a special shrine for Chinese civilians who
were massacred during the Japanese Occupation.45 Tan ardently insisted that there
should be ‘a separate memorial for the Chinese’ rather than a community memorial,
maintaining that the ‘Chinese victims were more numerous during the occupation’.46
The BMA’s plan for a community memorial never materialised due to mismanagement
and dwindling popular support. Twenty years later however, when numerous human
remains of the Sook Ching Massacre were discovered, leaders of the Singapore
Chinese community again lobbied for a memorial to honour their war dead,
spearheaded this time by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(SCCCI).47 Their efforts eventually led to the construction of Singapore’s official
civilian war memorial, but it was not one dedicated to the Chinese alone. The newly
elected independent government of Singapore led by the People’s Action Party (PAP)
intervened and insisted that if a war memorial was to be constructed it would have to
honour all civilians who lost their lives during the war, not just those of the Chinese.48
The PAP’s insistent stance was due largely to the concern at the time that the Chinese
majority might come to determine government policy in Singapore if left unchecked.49
This was a particular concern for the PAP because it was implementing a multi-racial
‘’Singaporean Singapore’ policy in Singapore after being elected into government
following the 1959 national elections.50 The SCCCI finally relented on its plans for a
Chinese memorial and erected, with the support from the PAP government,
Singapore’s official Second World War civilian war memorial.
On the anniversary of the fall of Singapore in 1967, the Memorial to the Civilian
Victims of the Japanese Occupation was unveiled. Its design was based on the
traditional one pillar Chinese memorials commonly found in the region but instead of
one it has four raised pillars to represent each of the four ethnic groups in Singapore.51
Each pillar is 67 meters tall, symbolising the year that it was erected. During the
unveiling ceremony the SCCCI also announced that management and ownership of the
war memorial would be passed over to the Singapore government. The SCCCI has,
however, continued to use the war memorial for its own commemoration services on
every anniversary of the Fall of Singapore.52 Its annual memorial services honour the
dead and incorporate Chinese customs of ancestor worship into its rituals. The
SCCCI’s memorial service also pays tribute to the efforts of its committee members
who made the creation of the memorial possible. Although the memorial exists in name
as Singapore’s official civilian war memorial it functions essentially as a de facto
Chinese war memorial. Without the motivation and efforts of the SCCCI and the
Chinese community in Singapore, a war memorial of this sort and scale might not have
materialised. But it also demonstrates the power and influence of Chinese nationalism
in postwar Singapore.
Is The Price of Peace a piece of popular wartime literature written in the tradition of
Kuomintang literary works, or anti-Japanese ‘Resistance Literature’, or a reflection of
an Overseas Chinese nationalist history in Singapore? Perhaps it lies somewhere in
between the three but it is far from history. In trying to write a history that is nonWestern and non-Eurocentric, has Foong instead come up with a local and Sino-centric
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version of Singapore’s wartime past? Foong’s work on Dalforce in The Price of Peace
illuminates the mindset of the overseas Chinese in Singapore who strongly identified
with China in its struggle with Japan. Therefore, when the Japanese threatened Malaya
and Singapore, the overseas Chinese saw it as a continuation of the struggle in the
homeland where the Chinese were already resisting Japanese occupation. This is a
marked departure from traditional Western perspectives on Singapore that attributes
the capitulation of Singapore largely to London’s failure to prepare for the war in the
Far East. For Foong, the Fall of Singapore is an extension of Japan’s war of aggression
stemming from the Sino-Japanese War. While Foong’s work on Dalforce does show
another side to the war not often seen elsewhere, the success of the Price of Peace at
both the public and official levels begs one basic question. Does a comfortable and
comforting Sino-centric, anti-Japanese popular and nativist narrative of the defence of
Singapore constitute history? As long as it ignores other voices evident in historical
sources, the answer must be in the negative. The Price of Peace is by far the most
popular literary work devoted to Singapore’s wartime past but at the same time it
encapsulates the many problems facing any war historian interested in any postcolonial
nation’s search for historical identity.

1

Foong had worked with several broadcasting stations from 1956 to 1981 before taking up a position
as Controller of the Drama Unit in the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation. The book also inspired
two more television war dramas in 2001, In Pursuit of Peace and its English equivalent, A War Diary.
Source: K. Blackburn & D. Chew, ‘Dalforce at the Fall of Singapore in 1942: An Overseas Chinese
Heroic Legend’, Journal of Chinese Overseas, Vol. 1, 2, Nov 2005, p. 236.
2
Speech by George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Trade and
Industry at the launch of The Price Of Peace on Saturday, 21 June 1997, National Archives of
Singapore.
3
T.J., Hu, ‘An Account of the War Fought by the Singapore Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army’ in
Foong, ed., The Price of Peace, True Accounts of the Japanese Occupation, Singapore Chinese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Asiapac, Singapore, 1997, p. 264.
4
G.B., Lee, The Syonan Years, Singapore Unders Japanese Rule 1942-1945, National Archives of
Singapore, Singapore, 2005, p. 49, and J. Davis, Transcript of Interview, National Archives of
Singapore, Accession no. 405.
5
T.J Hu, ‘A Letter to the British Advisor of Malaya Affairs (The Parkerton Open Letter)’ in Foong,
The Price of Peace, p. 283.
6
J. Davis, Transcript of Interview, Accession no. 405, National Archives of Singapore.
7
F. Brewer, Transcript of Interview, Accession no. 407, National Archives of Singapore.
8
F. Brewer was educated at Oxford University and in the two years he spent in Amoy, present-day
Xiamen, he learnt to speak Hokkien, a Chinese dialect from China’s southern region and widely
spoken in Singapore to this day. Before becoming a trainer, he was a volunteer with the rank of
Private in the Penang and Province Wellesley Volunteer Force, an organisation similar to the
Territorials in the UK.
9
F. Brewer, Transcript of Interview, National Archives of Singapore.
10
C. Ellis & P. Chamberlain, (eds), Handbook on the British Army 1943, Arms and Arms Press,
London, Hippocrene Books Inc., New York, 1976, pp. 20, 22. An infantry battalion, which can
constitute up to six rifle companies, is usually commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel with a Major as
second-in-Command.
11
T.J Hu, ‘We Fought at the Frontline Defending Singapore’ in Foong, The Price of Peace, p. 276.
12
Ibid.
13
T.J Hu, ‘An Account of the War’, p. 267.
14
Ibid., p. 270.
15
War Diary Australian 2/20 Infantry Battalion, AWM52-8-3-20-011, Australian War Memorial.
16
In the Australian army infantry command structure during the Second World War, four companies
made up one battalion and three battalions were formed under one brigade.

The Legendary Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army

17

71

T.J Hu, ‘We Fought at the Frontline Defending Singapore’, p. 276.
War Diary Australian 22nd Infantry Brigade, AWM52-8-2-22-009, Australian War Memorial; ‘tp’
in military terms is short for ‘troop’.
19
F. Brewer, Transcript of Interview, National Archives of Singapore.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
D. Wall, Singapore and Beyond, 2/20 Battalion Association Secretary, James Keady, Cowra NSW,
1985, p. 61.
23
Foong, The Price of Peace, pp. 264-281. The accounts of Hu Tie Jun, Deputy Commander of
Dalforce were presented in three chapters in Foong’s book.
24
Hu, ‘An Account of the War’, p. 267.
25
Hu, ‘A Letter to the British Advisor of Malaya Affairs’, p. 285.
26
T.J., Hu, ‘An Account of the War Fought by the Singapore Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army’ in
The Price of Peace, p. 272.
27
H. Frei, Guns of February, Ordinary Japanese Soldiers’ Views of the Malayan Campaign and the
Fall of Singapore 1941-42, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 2004, p. 82.
28
War Diary Australian 2/29 Infantry Battalion, AWM52-8-3-29-007, Australian War Memorial.
29
Blackburn & Chew, ‘Dalforce at the Fall of Singapore’, p. 234.
30
Ibid., p. 237.
31
Ibid., p. 256.
32
Ibid., p. 235.
33
Lee, The Syonan Years, p. 209.
34
Ibid., p. 209.
35
Ibid., p. 208.
36
Descriptions of Dalforce’s blue uniforms were described in F. Brewer’s interview and in Hu, ‘A
Letter to the British Advisor of Malaya Affairs’, p. 283.
37
P. Jowett, Chinese Civil War Armies 1911-1949, Osprey Publishing Oxford, New York, 1997, pp.
21-22.
38
S.N, Yeo and S.A, Ng, ‘The Japanese Occupation as Reflected in Singapore-Malayan Chinese
Literary Works after the Japanese Occupation’, in Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong, eds, War and
Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2000, p. 108.
39
China at War, Vol. II, March 1939, Number 3, The China Information Publishing Company, p. 5.
40
Yeo and Ng, ‘The Japanese Occupation’, p. 107.
41
Ibid., p. 115.
42
Ibid., pp. 115-116.
43
Ibid., pp. 116.
44
BMA/CA/81/45, British Military Administration Records, National Archives of Singapore.
45
Ibid.
46
BMA/CA/81/45, Annex A, British Military Administration Records, National Archives of
Singapore.
47
Not coincidently, the SCCCI was also the publisher for The Price of Peace. At the time when the
book was first published, its principal editor, Foong, was the SCCCI’s Senior Director of Cultural and
Community Affairs.
48
K. Blackburn, ‘The Collective Memory of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Creation of the
Civilian War Memorial in Singapore’ in Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society, Vol.
73, December 2000, pp.71-90, particularly, pp. 83-84.
49
Ibid., p. 85.
50
Ibid., pp. 84-85.
51
Ibid., p. 87.
52
Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, Singapore Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Program pamphlet for the 41st War Memorial Service for Civilian Victims
of the Japanese Occupation, p. 2.
18

